Abstract -Cyberspace has increasingly become a medium to express outrage, conduct protests, take revenge, spread opinions, and stir up issues. Many cyber attacks can be linked to current and historic events in the social, political, economic, and cultural (SPEC) dimensions of human conflicts in the physical world. These SPEC factors are often the root cause of many cyber attacks. Understanding the relationships between past and current SPEC events and cyber attacks can help understand and better prepare people for impending cyber attacks. The focus of this paper is to analyze these attacks in social dimensions and build a threat model based on past and current social events. A reasoning technique based on a novel combination of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) and hierarchical fact-proposition space (FPS) inference is applied to build the model.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks have become a widespread global problem causing massive damage to Internet users, organizations, and information infrastructures. Current anomaly detection models focus primarily on analyzing network traffic to prevent malicious activities (Kuhl & Kistner, 2007 , Liu et.al, 2008 , Peng & Hong, 2007 . Such approaches are proven to be inadequate since they fail to account for deviant human behaviors behind the anomalies. Meanwhile, evidence is growing that more cyber attacks are associated with current and historic events and factors in the social, political, economic, and cultural (SPEC) dimensions of the human world (Myers & Tan, 2003 , Slay, 2003 , Strategypage, 2008 .
Social conflicts in human world have often arisen by groups or individuals over incompatible goals, scarce resources, or the sources of power needed to acquire them (Avruch, 2004) . Cyberspace has become a new arena for "citizen warfare" in which individuals can express their personal or nationalistic sentiments and attack their "enemy" (Zubir, 2005) . Similarly, the Internet has become a powerful instrument for making social and political statements through cyber activities, including hostile attacks (Stakhanova et.al, 2008) . It is also known that the socio-technological status of the cyber attackers, their backgrounds and their motivations are essential factors in predicting, preventing and tracing cyber attacks in these dimensions (Markoff, 2008 , Rasche et.al, 2007 . Security experts and researchers have been trying to predict and preempt these attacks in order to reduce the damage. It's difficult to come up with effective attack prevention and detection techniques without a full understanding of the adversaries' behavior, their motives, goals, and the technological levels that influence their decisions to carry out an attack (Kshetri, 2006) .
Continuous and timely assessment of cyber attack factors is critical in making plans and taking measures to help reduce the risk. Effective protection against attacks requires the knowledge and understanding of the attack characteristics, such as the attack agents, motives, means, and possible system vulnerabilities that maybe used by the atacker. Identifying such attack factors involved in the past cyber attack events helps in uncovering details of attack techniques, and allows for the development of defensive measures that could prevent similar attacks both now and in the future . With a proper knowledge representation (Brachman, 1992) and reasoning techniques, it will be feasible to grasp the attack characteristics, for example, knowing how certain categories of attacks lead to specific consequences, and thus be able to select proper preventive strategies.
One of the goals of the research presented in this paper is to identify cyber attack patterns from a collection of events that have occurred in the past . The paper focuses on building a threat model by analyzing human intentions and means to carry out cyber attacks. The real world entities such as the attacker's motives, social events that triggered these attackers, attack targets etc., are all considered as components of the knowledge base for analyzing the potential correlations between historic and current SPEC events and cyber attacks. A Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) approach together with a Fact Proposition Space (FPS) inference mechanism is implemented in this research in an attempt to build a comprehensive threat model and provide a valuable insight toward the future attack characteristics.
There are several ongoing research efforts in academia, national labs, and industry involving security requirements, threats, attacks, and vulnerabilities. While most of the existing techniques to deter such attacks draw conclusions by analyzing network traffic and malicious activities, this paper focuses on building a threat model by analyzing human intentions and relevant factors to carry out cyber attacks. However, only social related cyber attacks were analyzed primarily in this paper .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews related work in cyber attack analysis. Section three discusses the methodology and the process used in this research, and illustrates our results. Finally, section four contains the conclusion and directions for future work.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Cyber attacks resulting from physical world conflicts
Stakhanova et al. developed a conceptual model for explaining the evolution of ideologically motivated cyber attacks (Stakhanova et.al, 2008) . Their work focused on understanding the nature of those attacks, their evolutions and factors influencing their emergence, aimed toward developing effective defense strategies against these types of threats. They adopted a sociological perspective for a conceptual model by analyzing the ideologically motivated attacks, and created methods to facilitate predictions and responses to the threats leading to such kind of attacks. The theoretical foundation behind their approach lays an explanation of collective behavior that occurs between people or a group of people sharing similar beliefs and attitudes in regard to a specific issue. Their conceptual model follows through three phrases: tension build up (the building up of emotional or physical tension among a large number of people), triggering factors (attack triggering mechanisms such as an event that suggests/justifies the release of the tension), and the attack (the actual collective behavior -a cyber attack).
A technical report (Cyber Attacks, 2001 ) published by the Institute for Security Technology Study at Dartmouth College examined several case studies of political conflicts that have led to attacks on cyber systems. Based on factual analysis, the report illustrated the cases of cyber attacks immediately accompanying physical attacks, revealed a close connection between conflict in the physical and cyber worlds, analyzed the vulnerability of critical infrastructure systems to cyber attacks and the increasing willingness of groups to target sensitive systems during political conflicts, and concluded that political conflicts between countries could be followed by an online campaign of mutual cyber attacks and web defacements. Steinberg (2005) proposed an approach to threat assessment by characterizing, predicting, and recognizing threat situations. The attack hypotheses were adaptively generated, evaluated, and refined as the understanding of the situations evolved. The proposed approach was built upon the advances in situation, ontology, and estimation theory. Relationships that were inferred and exploited in situation assessment include the logical/semantic relationships (such as taxonomic), physical relationships (such as spatiotemporal), functional relationship (such as organizational role), etc. These relationships were inferred from observed attributes of entities and their context threats were then modeled in terms of potential and actualized relationship between threatening entities (such as people) and threatened entities or targets. Indicators of threat situations relate to capability, opportunity, and intent of agents to carry out attack against various targets. The threat assessment process would then generate, evaluate and select hypotheses concerning threat situation, i.e., threat situations in which threat events (attacks) were likely in terms of entities' capability, opportunity and intent to carry out various attacks. By evaluating and selecting hypotheses, a Threat Assessment System would provide indications, warnings, and characterizations of possible, imminent or occurring attacks. Cimiano et al. (2005) proposed a model to learn concept hierarchy from text corpora. In order to derive attributes from certain text corpus, verb/prepositional phrase, verb/object, and verb/subject dependencies were parsed and extracted first. Then for each noun appearing as head of these argument positions, the corresponding verbs were used as attributes for building the formal context. A formal concept lattice was calculated on this basis. The learned concept hierarchy was compared in terms of similarity with handcrafted reference taxonomies. Further, the impact of using different information measures to weight the significance of a given object/attribute pair was examined.
Threat Assessment
Conceptual learning with Formal Concept Analysis
Zhao and Halang proposed a method based on rough set and concept lattice to conduct ontology mapping (2006) . In their approach, a reference concept lattice is first constructed with the use of a combination of two normalized contexts. Rough set theory is then employed to calculate the similarity measure of the two ontology nodes. The approach combines rough set theory and concept lattice theory to measure the concept nodes from two ontologies based on Tversky's similarity model. The use of an overlap coefficient to obtain similarity measure has also been used in the works of Liakata and Pulman (2008) and Bhagat et al. (2007) . Hospodka (2008) used Fact Proposition Space Inference to provide a valuable information fusion and belief integration engine. In his original work, a through prototype implementation of the system is made to demonstrate the capabilities and advantages of the hierarchical fact-proposition space model in risk assessment, consumer purchasing assistance, medical diagnostics, and other similar tasks. The approach used in this paper extends on this Fact Proposition Space Inference technique in a way that the belief value needed to make inference is generated from factual analysis with formal concept analysis and overlap coefficients computation.
Inference generation with Fact Proposition Space
A Fact Proposition Space (FPS) is an inference mechanism based on probability theory (Zhu, 1994) . The mathematical foundations of the FPS model are Bayes' theorem and propositional logics. According to Bayes' rule, the conditional probability of some event A occurring, given the occurrence of some other event B, is defined as P(A|B), and is read as "the Probability of event A given event B." In FPS model, there are two sets of information that are essential to the reasoning process, the fact set and the proposition set. Let F = {fi | i = 1..n }, n ≥ 1, be used to represent the fact set. Each element of F is a component of the evidence provided. It contains two parts: a semantic part denoted by S(fi) and a value part denoted by V(fi). The semantic part is natural language meaning of the fact and the value part can be a real number in the range from 0 to 1 to represent the belief value of the fact. Let P = {p j | j = 1..m }, m ≥ 1, be used to represent the proposition set. Each element of P contains two parts: a semantic part denoted by S(p j ), and a value part denoted by V(p j ). The semantic part is a natural language meaning of the proposition and the value part can be a real number in the range from 0 to 1 to represent the belief value of proposition. The FPS is a Cartesian product of the F and P sets in two-dimensional space E NxM , where N and M are the cardinalities of the sets F and P. Each element Ei j represent a node of the space E NxM , where each node has a functional form that describes the evaluation mechanism to be performed in this field.
An FPS representation can be regarded as a matrix where facts and evidence are influencing propositions to a question. Each column of the matrix represents some facts. Each row represents some proposition or a proposed answer to a question. A node Ei j represents how much belief that if the fact or evidence is true towards how much do we believe the proposed answer to be true. In probabilistic reasoning, the reasoning process will generate a continual belief value that quantifies the truth attached to the propositions Pj in the range of 0..1. In the FPS, the functional form Ei j is denoted by Ei j (F). In Bayesian reasoning, the Ei j represents the conditional probability. The value is used to denote an association between the fact and the expected evidence.
A hierarchical structure of FPS can be easily realized, and is beneficial in the way that it sub-divides a multi-level, multi-variant decision problem into a number of hierarchically organized FPS. In a hierarchical FPS, there are multiple fact sets and proposition sets. Some subset of facts could be related to one subset of propositions while another subset of facts could be related to another subset of propositions. The FPS handles the hierarchical structure by using a computation formula to get the highest belief among the proposed answers to the question, level by level.
The selected/proposed answer at a lower level is used as evidence, or a factual statement, for the next level within the hierarchy that the node influences. With the same computational steps happening at each element and each level of the hierarchy, this hierarchical FPS model is simple and regulated for its easy adaptation in reasoning process applications.
METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS
The methodology followed in this research is based on a predictive knowledge representation and integrated reasoning approach. The cyber threat model is built by analyzing, evaluating, and processing historic and current cases of cyber attacks. We focus only on those that are triggered by social events. These events are collected from various sources, mostly open-source intelligence, in order to construct a comprehensive knowledge base for reasoning. The knowledge base is in turn used for an assessment of the cyber attack threat through the Formal Concept Analysis and the Fact Proposition Space inference mechanism . We consider three important aspects of knowledge representation and reasoning in our approach, and divide the research into three phases:
1. Knowledge acquisition in Cyber attack domain from news and public domain text corpus. 2. Knowledge representation using Formal Concept Analysis (FCA). 3. Knowledge Inference and belief value generation using Fact Proposition Space (FPS).
3.1
Knowledge Acquisition in Cyber Attack domain In this phase, past and current cases of news articles and descriptive accounts of cyber attacks that are fueled by social disturbances or conflicts are collected from various resources. These cases and news reports are extracted by continuously monitoring open-source resources such as online news and articles, books, scholarly journals, and technical papers. Once a news report or article is acquired, the content of the articles is annotated with various factors that are part of an elaborative cyber attack domain model, as shown in Fig. 1 below.
The cyber attack domain model consists of following factors:  Social Motive: the motivation of the attacker or attack agents to commit a cyber attack with respect to the occurrence of social events.
 Attack Agents: human or group of humans with a motivation to carry out a cyber attack.
 Means: methods and techniques used by attacker or attack agents to attack.
 Technological Aspects: how certain means are carried out or what technologies are used to carry out certain cyber attack.
 Victims: human, organizations or governments that are affected by cyber attacks.
 Consequences: the final outcome and damage as a result of a cyber attack.
The cyber attack domain model is a semantic network used to represent the relationships between different factors and to link attributes to these factors. The categories identified under each factor in the above domain model are based on our current corpus of articles that describe cyber attack events (CyCast, 2011).
Understanding and listing all possible social motives is a challenge. To elaborate on social motives, a social event must be defined. For this purpose, a two-pronged approach is taken. First, multiple open source information and dictionary definitions of the word "social" are consulted. This effort resulted in a thorough coverage of interpretations for the word "social" as shown in Fig. 2a . This effort allowed identifying distinct categories of social events relevant to an understanding of cyber attacks. Fig. 2b . shows a partial view of the current taxonomy of social events. This taxonomy is by no means complete, and is subject to continuous refinement and adjustment based on community input. However, the taxonomy does cover the cyber attack cases currently in our corpus, which are listed in the appendix of this paper, where words and phrases that relate to the factors mentioned in Fig. 1 are tagged and shown in red color. The characteristics of a few selected examples of these cases are represented in a tabular format (Table 1) to show how various factors are identified.
Based on the selected example, we identified a set of elements representing the social motives, attack agents, means, technological aspects, and consequences in these social relevant cyber attacks. The elements include:
( Note that these elements are extracted from the use cases of our collected corpus only.
Knowledge Representation with Formal Concept Analysis (FCA)
The knowledge representation with the use of Formal Concept Analysis provides us the ability to see various hierarchical structures as well as the clusters of related concepts (Puerta et.al, 1994) .
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is a method for formal representation of conceptual knowledge. It is often used for analysis of implicit relationships between objects described through a set of attributes (Ganter, 1999) . There are three levels of analysis in terms of which methods of formal representation. The first level is a basic data context that consists of a binary relation between objects and attributes. The second level explains conceptual relationships for data matrices, and the third level allows a study of the representation, inference, and communication of conceptual knowledge mathematically (Wille, 1997) .
Data in a FCA is represented in a basic data type, called a Formal Context, expressed as a triple K = (G, M, I ), where G is a set of objects, M is a set of attributes, and I  (G ×M) is a binary relation between the sets of objects and the sets of attributes (Wille, 1997) . The formal context is usually represented by a cross table. The elements on the left side are formal objects; the elements at the top are formal attributes; and the relation between them is represented by the crosses (Table 2) . Within a formal context, a formal concept c is defined as an ordered pair (A, B) such that:
where A is called the extent (Ext(c) ) of the concept c and B is said to be its intent (Int(c)). A formal concept (A, B) is a subconcept of a formal concept (C, D), if the extent A is a subset of the extent of C or if the intent of B is a superset of the intent of D. Their relation is shown as (A, B) ≤ (C, D) . A partially ordered set of all formal concepts is always a complete lattice structure and is called a concept lattice.
From the formal context, a concept lattice can be drawn. This concept lattice consists of the set of concepts and the relationships between them. Each node in the lattice, as shown in Fig. 3 , is a formal concept. The bottom-half of a node is colored blue if the node owns an object; similarly the top-half of the node is colored blue if it owns an attribute. The default color is white. Formal objects are shown slightly below the formal concept whereas formal attributes are shown slightly above the formal concept. Each concept in the lattice represents a maximal subgrouping of objects (concept extent) with shared attributes (concept intent). The lattice captures the partial order among all such concepts. Such representations support both automatic inference and user-guided discovery and exploration of hypotheses.
The lattice in Fig. 3 is annotated in a concise way to determine the intent and the extent of the formal concepts as follows: (1) all attributes encountered by navigating upward from a given formal concept are associated with that formal concept; and (2) the objects encountered navigating downward from a given formal concept are all associated with that formal concept. For example, in Fig. 3 , the formal concept annotated with "Object5" includes "Attribute1," "Attribute2," "Attribute3," as well as "Attribute5" in its intent. Similarly, by navigating downwards from "Object 5", we determine that it includes only "Object 5" in its extent. The path obtained by navigating upward from a concept is called the "filter" and the path navigating downward is called the "ideal". Table 3 shows the Formal context table of the example use cases studied in this paper, with cyber attack news articles as objects and cyber attack factors as attributes. In the next step, all the objects (i.e. cyber attack news articles) that have the same attribute (social motive) are grouped together. The result of this grouping allows building a new formal context representation. As an illustrative example, the cause-and-effect relations from the "motives" to its corresponding "attributes" are shown in Table 4 .
3.3
Knowledge Inference The concept lattice is very useful in deriving inferences from knowledge represented in formal contexts (Sowa, 2000) . Both qualitative and quantitative inferences can be performed on the lattice. In this section, two important inference mechanisms, mainly qualitative and quantitative inferences are performed from an interpretation of the lattice. With qualitative inference, characteristics and relationships among objects and attributes are discovered. Quantitative inference from the concept lattice provides approximate belief values to be used in a Fact Proposition Space model for socially motivated cyber attack threat assessment.
Qualitative Inference
In the concept lattice diagram of Fig. 4 each node is a formal concept. An object can only fall under the concept if it has all the attributes of that concept. For example, looking at the formal concept labeled with the object ("M1: Protest Controversial Events"), the attributes ("Hacktivists, Business and Commercial organizations, Disruption of service, Exhaustion of computer resources, and Penetration attempt") identified by navigating above are all those associated with that object. It can be inferred from the selected formal concept that the (object) social motive of "Protest controversial events" is relevant to the following attributes: attack agents are "Hacktivists", attack means is "Penetration attempt", technological aspect in carrying out the means is "exhaustion of computer resource leading to denial of service", victims are "business and commercial organizations", and finally the consequence of the attack is "disruption of service". This inference is predictive of the recent cyber attacks related to Wikileaks (Mackey, 2011) .
Similarly, in Fig. 5 , if we select the formal concept labeled with the attribute "Hacktivists", the objects (M1, M2, M3, and M4) identified by navigating below all share the attribute. The inference that is derived from the selected formal concept in Fig. 5 is: one of the possible attack agents is "Hactivists" when social motives are either "Protest controversial events," "Protest human rights abuse," "Protest information censorship and web filtering," or "Protest policies having negative impact on environment." FCA allows us to make systematic inferences and to derive coherent explanations for cyber attacks in terms of their social dimensional factors.
Quantitative Inference
The concept lattice can be investigated with algebraic methods to unravel its structure (Ganter, 1999) . For our work, quantitative inference derives an approximate belief value in the range from 0 to 1, calculated using overlap coefficient. To obtain an approximate belief value, first the overlap coefficients for all the objects/attributes relationships are calculated. These overlapping coefficients are then used as probabilities for a formal object cooccurring with a formal attribute.
An overlapping coefficient is a similarity measure that computes the overlaps between two binary vectors (Manning & Schutze, 1999) . The overlap coefficient between set A and B is defined as:
To calculate the overlap coefficient, objects and attributes are mapped with respect to the cyber attack domain model shown in Fig. 1 . From the cyber attack domain model, it is clear that "Attack Agents" are triggered by "Social Motive." A corresponding formal context table for "Social Motive" as objects and "Attack Agents" as attributes is represented in Table 5 .
In calculating the overlap coefficient, we consider objects and attributes as two individual sets. For example, the set "Social Motive" contains elements of "Protest controversial events," "Protest unpopular commemorative events or anniversary," "Protest human rights abuse," etc. Similarly, the set of "Attack Agents" contains the elements of "Vandals/Hackers," "Nation/States," and "Hacktivists." The overlap coefficients between the object set "Social Motive" and the attribute set "Attack Agents" are obtained by a two-step process. First, a formal concept node representing the object is selected, for example, the "Social Motive" M1: Protest controversial events, as shown in Fig. 6a . Second, a formal concept representing an attribute is selected, for example, the "Attack Agents" A1: Vandals/Hackers, as shown in Fig. 6b . All the nodes below the selected node are the element of the object "Social Motives". From the Figure, it is clear that there is no overlap between the object "M1" and the attribute "A1", so the overlap coefficient is 0. This means that in the past we have not observed any event where "M1" and "A1" co-occur. Similarly, the formal concept node representing the object ("Social Motive" "M3: Protest human rights abuse") has two nodes as its elements (Fig. 7a.) . The formal concept node representing the attribute "A3: Hacktivists" (Fig. 7b) has two nodes as its elements. In this case, the overlap coefficient is 1. This means that "M1" and "A1" have cooccurred in all the past events. In the same manner, overlap coefficients for all the object and attribute combinations of these specific cases are calculated, and the results are shown in Tables 6, 7, 8, and Fig. 8 , respectively. Table 9 , Fig. 9 , and Table 10 show the formal context, concept lattice and overlap coefficient for the "Means" as objects and "Victims" and "Technological Aspects" as attributes, respectively.
After the calculation of overlap coefficients for each of objects/attributes relationships, our next step is to generate corresponding belief values. This is done by taking the average of the calculated overlap coefficients and representing them in the range from 0 to 1 based on their numerical value. The belief value represents the strength of relationships between objects and attributes.
Inference with Fact Proposition Space (FPS) model
To generate inference using the Fact Proposition Space model (Zhu, 1994) , a decision tree/graph is constructed, as shown in Fig. 10 , based on the cyber attack domain model of Fig.1 . The root node in the graph is called focal point; from this point the rest of the graph is started. In Fig. 10 , all arrows point in a direction leading to the parent. This shows the direction of influence that one node has on another node. Each node in the tree represents a topic that is seeking an answer to its questions, or a belief in what is true about the topic. Every child node represents the topic that needs to be resolved before their parent node can be resolved. Since the child node is a topic that influences its parent node, so the proposition of the child node topic influences the parent's node propositions.
In Fig. 10 , the focal point is the "Consequences" of cyber attacks given that there is a social conflict or disruption in social dimensions. The propositions for the "Consequences" of cyber attacks are:
 Damage of computational resources  Disruption of Service  Unauthorized modification and fabrication of information  Information/Data Loss From the focal point, input is broken down into three major influencing subtopics:  Victims,  Means, and  Technological Aspects
These three are the sources of information, which would influence the consequences of cyber attacks. Since the decision tree is a graph and is based on cyber attack domain model, subtopics reappear as a source of information for multiple parent topics. The leaf node for each subtopic is "Social Motives" which are derived from the use cases as listed in the appendix:  Protest controversial events  Protest unpopular commemorative days, events, or anniversary  Protest human rights abuse  Protest information censorship/ web filtering  Protest Policies having negative impact on environment The next step is to create a scenario of a "Cyber Attack Threat" in the Fact Proposition Web Application (Hospodka, 2008) based on the decision tree. This scenario provides a means to find out the consequences of cyber attacks, given occurrences of specific social events. A cyber attack threat hierarchy is created adding nodes/topics based on the decision tree. Fig. 11 illustrates, as an example, the probability propagations (through a table of calculation) at an intermediate step of the inference hierarchy for the "Threat Model" in the FPS application. Note that the page has different layout designs and settings at different levels and stages of the inference process. In the figure, each leaf node is a fact (i.e. "Social Motives"). P1, P2, P3 are propositions of "Attack Agents". For example, given the condition that a fact of "Social Motives" (as an "object") appears at a level 3 ("High"), which translates to a high probability value, say at 0.75, and the conditional probabilities that the "Attack Agents" being "Vandals/Hackers," "Nations/States," and "Hacktivists" is at 0.025, 0.025, and 0.9 under the given condition, as shown in Fig. 11 , the probability that an attack could take place by the corresponding "Attack Agents" will be 0.019, 0.019, and 0.68 respectively. This means that under the given situation, a cyber attack is more likely to be launched by the hecktivists. An overall risk/threat factor of an information system or a web service potentially to be under attack by the "Vandals/Hackers" or "Nations/States" or "Hacktivists" with respect to an occurring event can be calculated by accumulating these components with respect to the factors such as the "means" and "Technological Aspect" all together.
Values in the matrix are calculated in a way as described in section 3.3.2 on Quantitative Inference. A level up from "Social Motives" in the hierarchy tree is the node "Attack Agents". A level up from the node "Attack Agents" in the hierarchy tree is the node "Means". The highest-level node is "Consequences." After all the leaf node propositions have been filled, a factor is selected as shown in Fig. 12 . The factor selector interface helps selecting propositions that is true for each and every leaf node.
When the application is executed, it is possible to see the belief values at each level and each node in the hierarchy. The inference process determines which proposition to select at each node, and propagates belief values up the tree to get the final result at the focal point. An example is shown in Fig.13 for the probabilistic computation of the "consequences" which is at the top level of the inference. Note that the web page contents and layout design is different from the one shown in Fig. 11 which shows a screen layout for an intermediate step of the inference process. Here a user can navigate through the hierarchy to see which proposition was selected, as well as where and at which belief value it was chosen.
What makes the Fact Proposition Space (FPS) model and the FPS web application efficient is its ability to predict the consequences of cyber attacks for real world cases of social events and conflicts. During the final draft of this paper (December of 2010), recent news included "The Publication of Government's Secret Information by WikiLeaks". In the following paragraph, the FPS model simulates the consequences given this news about "WikiLeaks". The result below shows the inferences derived from the cyber event "WikiLeaks" and generalizes the attack characteristics, where the news about "WikiLeaks" relates to social motive "Protesting of Controversial and Unpopular Events". As a result, in the web application the factors for "Protest Controversial Events" and "Protest Unpopular Events" are selected as "Level 3" (high) and other factors as Level 1 (low), as shown in the Fig. 14.
After the factors have been selected, the application is executed. The final result is shown in the Fig. 15 . The figure shows that a different result is obtained in comparison to the one shown in Fig. 11 . The example illustrates that the inference engine reacts properly and sensitively corresponding to different event inputs with different characteristic settings of the initial states. The result shows that the belief value is highest (0.504) for proposition description "Information and Data Loss" in the node "Consequences". Similarly, we can find that the highest belief value for the "Victims" is the proposition description for "Individuals/Civilians," which is at 0.483. The highest belief value for the "Means" is 0.276, which is "Penetration Attempt" This indicates that the means of attack used by supporters of "WikiLeaks" is predicted to primarily consist of "Penetration Attempt." Similarly, the highest value for "Technological Aspects" is 0.398 for "SQL and Code Injection." In this way, the FPS model generalizes and makes inferences about cyber attacks for real world events that may lead to cyber attacks. Though the accuracy of these predictions remains to be seen on a larger set of real world events, operation payback (Horn, 2010) launched by "WikiLeaks" supporters on companies such as PayPal, Mastercard and Visa for restricting donations to the site provides a strong alignment with our findings.
CONCLUSION
The use cases of physical world SPEC event triggered cyber attacks are on the rise. While most of the existing techniques to deter such attacks draw conclusions by analyzing network traffic and malicious activities, the research described in this paper focuses on building a threat model by analyzing previous and current cyber attacks. The threat model proposed in this paper is based on a formal knowledge representation and reasoning method. A Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) approach and a Fact Proposition Space (FPS) inference technique are implemented in multiple steps towards building a comprehensive threat model. The two approaches make the core of the formal knowledge representation and reasoning system. The following paragraph summarizes the entire process.
A knowledge base is created by continuously collecting news, articles, technical reports, and scholarly papers on real cases of cyber attacks fueled by social disputes. A semantic model in cyber attack domain is built in order to identify different factors that are associated with the attacks. Content of the news articles are annotated with various factors. Such annotation allows parameterization of the rich information expressed in news articles. Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is used to conceptually represent the information. While FCA has been used in the past to analyze data, and for investigating and processing given information, it hasn't been used for the analysis of cyber attacks. The use of FCA for analyzing cyber attacks in terms of objects/attributes relationships makes this research unique.
Two important aspects of FCA -the formal context and the concept lattice are used to make systematic inferences and derive coherent explanations for cyber attacks in terms of their social motivations and factors such as attack agents, attack means, technological aspects, attack victims, and attack consequences. Further, approximate belief values are generated by deriving overlap coefficients from objects/attributes relationships. This belief value acts as an input in the Fact Proposition Space inference. To generate inference using the Fact Proposition Space model, a decision tree/graph is built in the Fact Proposition Space -a Web Application -using the cyber attack domain model. Executing the FPS application allows model cyber attack threat assessment. Thus deriving systematic inferences of cyber attacks threat relationships with FCA and processing output from FCA with fact proposition inference engine allows building a comprehensive cyber attack threat model.
Our current research is only exploratory. Most of the cyber attack factors and attributes identified and represented in this paper are related to social dimension only. There are a number of limitations of the approach implemented in this research.
1. First, the categories identified under each factor in cyber attack domain are based on the current corpus only. As the corpus grows, new categories can be derived. 2. Similarly, the taxonomy of social motives is subject to continuous refinement and adjustment based on community input. 3. The overlap coefficient and the belief values are derived on the basis of formal context and concept lattice. As more cases of cyber attack cases news articles are analyzed, these values may change to reflect the nature of cyber attack threats. 4. The unreliability, incompleteness and richness of expression in vast amounts of unstructured text make prediction of cyber attacks a difficult problem. 5. Finally, the scalability of FCA to large contexts is a problem. However, by producing a bounded context that includes only the most closely associated news articles (from a large knowledge base) to a given article under investigation, the computational performance can be managed for most practical tasks.
Though major concepts addressed in this paper focus on cyber attacks threat triggered by social motives, similar concepts can be applied to build a threat model related to the political, cultural, or economic dimensions . Implementation of the methodology used in this paper to build a threat model for other motivations would make the research more significant. Table  Table 3 :Formal context table with cyber attack news articles as objects and cyber attack factors as attributes Table 4 . Formal context table with social motive as objects and other factors as attributes Table 5 . Formal context with "Social Motive" as objects and "Attack Agents" as attributes Table 6 . Overlap coefficients for "Social Motive" as objects and "Attack Agents" as attributes Table 7 . Formal Context with "Attack Agents" as objects and "Means, Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 8 . Overlap coefficients for "Attack Agents" as objects and "Means, Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 9 . Formal Context with "Means" as objects and "Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 10 . Overlap coefficients for "Means" as objects and "Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Tables   Table 1. Mapping words and phrases that infer to the factors of cyber attack domain model Table 5 . Formal context with "Social Motive" as objects and "Attack Agents" as attributes Table 6 . Overlap coefficients for "Social Motive" as objects and "Attack Agents" as attributes Table 7 . Formal Context with "Attack Agents" as objects and "Means, Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 8 . Overlap coefficients for "Attack Agents" as objects and "Means, Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 9 . Formal Context with "Means" as objects and "Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes Table 10 . Overlap coefficients for "Means" as objects and "Victims, and Technological Aspects" as attributes
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